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Abstract
An analytical model to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. 
generic milk advertising which incorporates the degree of market 
competition is presented. Unlike traditional perfect competition 
models, the imperfect competition model allows for simultaneous 
movement of both price and quantity with an endogenous fluid 
(Class I) price differential. The simulation results of the 
imperfect competition model are compared with the conventional 
exogenous fluid price differential model. It is shown that the 
conventional fixed fluid price differential model may under-state 
the effectiveness of U.S. generic milk advertising in terms of 
returns to producers.
Key words: generic milk advertising, imperfect competition, 
fluid differential.
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Evaluating U.S. Generic Milk Advertising Effectiveness Using an imperfect Competition Model
Nobuhiro Suzuki, Harry M. Kaiser, John E. Lenz,
and Olan D. Forker
Introduction
Although raw milk is essentially a homogeneous input in the 
production of fluid milk and manufactured dairy products, in many 
countries the price received for fluid milk usage is higher than 
the price received for manufactured product usage. Such 
differences indicate that the prices are not competitively 
determined. This is also the case in the U.S. because a federal 
or state milk marketing order programs establish minimum Class I 
price differentials (premiums) for most of the milk that is 
marketed, and in addition over-order fluid premium payments exist 
in many markets as a result of negotiations between cooperatives 
and fluid processors.
Changes in milk advertising expenditures, in theory, will 
bring about changes in milk prices as well as in milk demand. 
Thus, the effectiveness of an advertising program should be 
measured to account for both changes in price and quantity; price 
and quantity should each be treated as endogenous. In most 
studies of U.S. dairy markets, an exogenous fluid milk price 
(Thompson, Eiler, and Forker; Liu and Forker 1989, 1990; Ward and 
Dixon; Blisard, Sun, and Blaylock), or an exogenous fluid (Class 
I) price differential (Kaiser, Streeter, and Liu; Kaiser et al.; 
Liu et al.) is assumed. No models known to the authors have 
incorporated a degree of competition measure in models of the
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U.S. dairy industry, nor has an endogenously determined fluid 
price differential been introduced (except for Suzuki et al).
In this paper, a model to measure the effectiveness of U.S. 
generic milk advertising is developed which incorporates the 
degree of market competition. The usefulness of the model is 
then demonstrated by illustrating the relative differences of 
simulation results between the model which has an endogenously 
determined fluid price differential reflecting the current degree 
of market competition and a conventional model that utilizes an 
exogenous fluid price differential. We hypothesize that the 
former model will provide better estimates of the effects of 
generic milk advertising than the latter.
Although there are several criticisms of an approach that 
identifies the degree of market competitiveness, especially 
regarding a dynamic feedback game, its usefulness in empirical 
studies has been widely accepted in the literature (Appelbaum; 
Azzam; Azzam and Pagoulatos; Azzam and Schroeter; Bresnahan 1982, 
1989; Chen and Lent; Dixit; Durham and Sexton; Holloway; Iwata; 
Karp and Perloff; Maier; Schroeter; Schroeter and Azzam;
Sullivan; Suzuki, Lenz and Forker; Wann and Sexton; Wilson and 
Casavant).
Imperfect Competition, Milk Marketing Orders and Dairy 
Cooperatives
At the turn of the century, about 40 years before federal 
milk marketing orders were instituted, dairy cooperatives 
introduced the use of classified pricing and pooling of funds to 
generate greater returns to dairy farmers (Cassels). However, 
they were not completely successful due to their lack of complete
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control over the milk supply since not all farmers were 
cooperative members. An independent (non-cooperative) farmer had 
an economic incentive to sell his milk to a proprietary fluid 
dealer rather than a cooperative because the fluid dealer could 
pay slightly more than the cooperative's pooled return or blend 
price, but still lower than the cooperative's Class I price. Due 
to the independent-producer problem the cooperatives lobbied for 
and eventually obtained government regulation to enforce 
classified pricing market-wide in the form of marketing orders 
(Novakovic and Pratt).
Under the marketing order system, the minimum Class I 
differential (the difference between the price received for milk 
used for fluid products and that for manufacturing) is fixed by 
the authority of the federal government, or in some cases state 
government. In many markets, the effective price for fluid milk 
use is higher than the minimum Class I price as a result of 
cooperatives' bargaining for over-order fluid payments (Fallert, 
p. 154). Consequently, the effective fluid milk price 
differential is the minimum Class I differential plus any over­
order payment.
The ability of producers to negotiate over-order payments 
for fluid milk depends on the producer organization's share of 
the total supply. If milk handlers can buy milk from non­
cooperative producers, it will be difficult for a cooperative 
group to obtain premiums above the minimum Class I price 
(Robinson, p. 115). Therefore, the effective fluid milk price 
differential reflects the degree of imperfection in U.S. milk 
market created mainly by the federal orders and dairy
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cooperatives. Although the countervailing power of processors 
may reduce cooperative market power, this paper concentrates on 
cooperative market power and does not explicitly consider 
processors' oligopsonistic power.
Theoretical Model
To measure the degree of imperfection, a perfectly
competitive market is defined as a basis of comparison. In a
perfectly competitive market, cooperatives are without market
power. One would expect a relatively uniform manufacturing milk
price nationwide. According to Robinson,
"Class II or manufacturing milk prices are 
approximately the same in all markets and are linked to 
the M-W (Minnesota-Wisconsin) price. Uniform pricing 
of manufacturing milk is necessary because products 
derived from surplus milk are easily transported 
between regions. Cheese, butter, and skim-milk powder 
produced in federal-order markets must compete with 
similar products manufactured from grade B milk in 
Minnesota and Wisconsin. Handlers operating in 
federal-order markets will not purchase surplus milk if 
it is priced higher than what unregulated plants pay 
for manufacturing milk in the Midwest." (Robinson, p.
116)
Individual farmers, without cooperative market power and any 
revenue pooling, would directly compete with each other until the 
price difference between fluid and manufacturing milk would 
disappear except for modest locational differences. If a market 
did not have enough milk to meet local fluid uses, there would be 
some locational or transportation differentials paid for fluid 
milk even without marketing orders and cooperatives because fluid 
plants would have to transport milk from further distances.
Fluid plants tend to be located near population centers, while 
manufacturing plants tend to be located near farms because dairy
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products are less bulky to ship than raw or fluid milk. For 
simplicity, we ignore such possibilities because the number of 
deficit areas and the magnitude of fluid differentials in a 
perfectly competitive market is difficult to predict. Several 
previous studies, which tried to estimate welfare losses caused 
by marketing orders, also assumed no differentials as a benchmark 
for comparison (Buxton; Dahlgran; Ippolito and Masson; Masson and 
Eisenstat).
If one specifies that, under imperfect competition, the role 
of dairy cooperatives is to allocate their raw milk supply to 
fluid and manufacturing markets so as to maximize total milk 
sales revenues, the first order condition is to equate marginal 
revenues from fluid and manufacturing milk. If the cooperatives 
undertake processing themselves, manufacturing costs should be 
taken into account. For simplicity, our model does not 
incorporate them. Under perfect competition, the first order 
condition is simply expressed as:
(1) Pf = Pm/
where Pf is fluid milk price, Pm is manufacturing milk price.
At the opposite extreme, the first order condition for 
monopoly or collusion is:
(2) Pf (1 - 1/e) = Pm(l - 1/if) ,
where e = | (3Qf/3Pf) • (Pf/Qf) | and ij = | (3Qm/aPm) • (Pm/Qm) | are 
price elasticities of fluid and manufacturing milk demand in 
absolute terms, respectively; Qf is aggregate quantity of fluid 
milk demand; and Qm is aggregate quantity of manufacturing milk 
demand.
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To express an intermediate degree of imperfect competition, 
a "market power" parameter, 0, is introduced. Then, equality 
across markets of "perceived" marginal revenue is expressed as:
(3) Pf(l - 6f/e) = Pm(l - Ojr,) , 
or (4) Pf + 6f-Qf/(3Qf/3Pf) = Pm + 0m*Qm/(dQm/3Pm)•
0 (O<0<1) is considered an aggregate indicator of cooperatives' 
market power under the federal order system. Marginal milk 
production cost does not enter equation (3) because milk 
production is almost never controlled by cooperatives, but rather 
it is determined by individual farmers' response to blend prices 
they receive.
If 6 can be assumed to be the same for both fluid and 
manufacturing markets, one can identify a value of 6 which 
satisfies equation (3) or (4), with values of milk price 
elasticities estimated by demand functions and observations of 
Pf, Pm, Qf, and Qm. However, 6m will probably be lower than $f 
because fluid milk is costlier to transport than manufactured 
milk, and, therefore, the geographical scope of markets for 
manufactured milk products in general will exceed that for fluid 
milk. This means that a given milk marketer will face more 
competition in the manufactured milk market.
Instead of deriving 6 (0f = 6m) by estimating both fluid and 
manufacturing demand equations, one could estimate the fluid (or 
manufacturing) demand equation and equation (3) or (4) into which 
the manufacturing (or fluid) demand equation is substituted. 6 
is directly estimated as a coefficient of (3) or (4) using this 
method (Bresnahan 1982), and 6f and 9m can be separately 
identified. However, the coefficients for the manufacturing (or
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fluid) demand equation cannot be identified (See Appendix). 
Consequently, there is not a perfect method for identifying 0 f 
and 0m.
The solution to this problem adopted here is to assume that 
0m = 0 and then solve for 0 f . The assumption that 0m = 0 is 
fairly realistic because the manufacturing milk price for each 
market is given as the M-W price, and the M-W price is indirectly 
supported by government purchases of dairy products. We use the 
assumption (0m = 0) and identify a value of 0f which satisfies 
(3) or (4), assuming that 0f is constant in each time period and 
that cooperatives approximately realize the condition expressed 
by (3) or (4). To check differences of simulation results caused 
by differences of 0 estimates, we also use a derived value of 0 
assuming 0f = 0m.
The full dairy sector imperfect competition model is 
expressed as:
Milk production:
(5) Q = f (BP)
Fluid milk demand:
(6) Qf = g(Pf, Af)
Manufacturing milk demand:
C7) Qm = h(Pm, AJ
Milk sales maximizing allocation:
(8)  P(  + (dQ£/d P f )  = Pm + em-Qm/ ( ) Q m/BPm)
Milk uses identity:
(9) Q = Qf + Qm + FUSE
Blend price:
(10) BP = (Pf-Qf + Pm'Qm)/(Q - FUSE),
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where Q is aggregate milk production, BP is blend price1, Af is 
fluid milk advertising expenditures, Aj,, is manufacturing milk 
advertising expenditures, and FUSE is on-farm use of milk 
produced (assumed to be exogenous), with all other variables as 
previously defined. The other exogenous variables such as feed 
price, income, and trend, are not included in the above 
simplified expressions. With the six endogenous variables (Q,
Qf, Qm, Pf, Pm, BP) and six equations, the model is complete. 
Because this model expresses farmers' supply and processors' 
demand for raw milk, government purchases of dairy products and 
changes in commercial inventories are not treated separately, 
i.e., manufacturing milk demand (Qm) includes commercial 
manufacturing demand, government purchases of dairy products, and 
changes in commercial inventories on a milk-equivalent basis.
The imperfect competition model expressed by equations (5) 
through (10) is transformed to a conventional exogenous fluid 
(Class I) price differential model when equation (8) is replaced 
with:
(11) Pf = Pm + DIFF,
where DIFF is the exogenous fluid (Class I) price differential.
1The blend price is a uniform price received by all farmers in 
the market and is equal to the average of the Class I and Class II 
prices, weighted by utilization rates of how the milk is used 
between fluid and manufacturing purposes.
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Empirical Model Estimation2
Over-Order Payment Data
The effective fluid milk price is equal to the M-W price 
(the manufacturing class price in most federal orders) plus the 
minimum Class I differential plus any over-order payment. Since 
the only available data on over-order payments pertain to 
"announced" over-order payments in 35 markets by the USDA, it is 
difficult to collect the over-order payment data for all 
cooperatives over time and to make a national average time-series 
data set. Instead, we estimate the effective fluid milk price 
(Pf) by solving the blend price equation for Pf:
(12) Pf = [BP* (Q-FUSE)-Pm*Qm) ]/Qf 
The difference between the Class II and III prices is minor and 
neglected. The blend price (BP) is the all milk price reported 
by the USDA which includes over-order payments. The differences 
between the estimated effective fluid milk price and the minimum 
Class I price are shown in Figure 1. The effective prices are 
higher than the minimum prices in almost all years, indicating 
the existence of over-order payments. Figure 1 implies that many 
previous models had internal data inconsistency because they used 
the minimum Class I price and the all milk price.
2The data and its sources are listed in Kaiser et al.
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Figure 1. Fluid Milk Prices
1970.1 1972.1 1974.1 1976.1 1978.1 1980.1 1982.1 1984.1 1986.1 1988.1 1990.1 
1971.1 1973.1 1975.1 1977.1 1979.1 1981.1 1983.1 1985.1 1987.1 1989.1
Year
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Milk supply (Q) is estimated using quarterly data from 1975 
to 1990 as a function of the current and lagged milk-feed price 
ratio (MF = blend price / feed price), time trend (TREND) 
representing technical progress, intercept dummy variables for 
the Milk Diversion Program (MDP) and the Dairy Termination 
Program (DTP), and harmonic seasonality variables (SIN1, COS1, 
and C0S2). The econometric results are presented in Table 1, 
along with the rest of the estimated equations. All variables 
are defined in Table 2. A polynomial distributed lag is imposed 
to account for lagged effects of the milk-feed price ratio.3 The 
second degree polynomial distributed lag with both endpoints 
constrained to lie close to zero, with the six quarter lag 
length, provides the most significant results. This lag length 
seems reasonable considering the biological reproduction cycle. 
The long run price elasticity of milk supply is 0.224, which is 
similar to Chavas and Klemme's estimated two-year price 
elasticity of 0.20, and Weersink's estimate of 0.29. To overcome 
significant first-order autocorrelation in the disturbance term, 
the Cochrance-Orcutt procedure is employed. Two-Stage-Least- 
Squares (TSLS) estimation is used because both milk production 
and the blend price are endogenous in the model.
Supply Function
3Because long run milk-feed price effects are considered by 
imposing a polynomial distributed lag, cow numbers are not included 
in explanatory variables.
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Table 1. Estimated Equations for U.S. Milk Supply, Fluid Demand, and 
Manufacturing Demand
Dependent
Variables
Milk Supply 
ln(Q)
Fluid Demand 
Q,/N
Manufacturing Demand 
Qm/N
Estimation 1975.2 - 90.4 76.3 - 90.4 76.3 - 90.4
Periods
Independent
Variables
Intercept 3.899(24.75)* -0.077(-2.49) 0.378(4.66)
ln(MF) 0.019(3.86)
ln(MF).., 0.032(3.86)
ln(MF).2 0.040(3.86)
ln(MF).3 0.043(3.86)
ln(MF)_4 0.040(3.86)
ln(MF)_6 0.032(3.86)
ln(MF).6 0.019(3.86)
TREND 0.0039(8.17)
MDP -0.024(-1.67)
DTP -0.041(-2.94) -0.0059(-1.71)
SIN1 -0.0053(-1.94) 0.0016(8.28) -0.0013(-1.98)
C0S1 -0.052(-19.57) 0.0023(10.15) -0.0074(-9.08)
COS 2 0.071(5.40) 0.00018(3.70) 0.00074(2.12)
(UQ)., 0.734(7.57)
Pf/CPI -0.105(-3.16)
INC/CPI 0.0011(2.70 -0.0069(-3.55)
(GA,) 1.0 X10'7 (3.10)
(GA,)., 1.7 X10'7 (3.10)
(GA,).2 2.0 X10'7 (3.10)
(GA,)* 2.0X10'7(3.10)
(GA,)* 1.7 X 10‘7 (3.10)
(GA,)* 1.0 X10’7 (3.10)
BA, 6.8 X10'7 (2.60)
AU19 0.387(4.85)
(UQ,/N) 0.788(4.94)
Pm/CPI -1.113(-3.96)
(BAm) 3.6X10'7(2.34)
(BAm)., 5.4 X10'7 (2.34)
(BAm) ,2 5.4 X10'7 (2.34)
(BAm) ,3 3.6 X10'7 (2.34)
D89.4 0.018(2.80)
D90.4 -0.022(-3.16)
(UQm/N)., 0.670(3.78)
Adj. R2 0.95 0.92 0.78
D.W. 1.79 2.02 1.74
“Figures in parentheses are t-values.
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Table 2. Definitions for the Variables Used in the Equations Presented in 
Table 1
Q = milk production (billion pounds),
MF = (blend price)/(feed price), where blend price is all milk price ($/cwt) 
and feed price is U.S. average price of 16% protein dairy feed ($/ton), 
TREND = time trend variable equal to 1 for 1970, quarter 1,..., MDP =
intercept dummy variable for the Milk Diversion Program equal to 1 for 
1984, quarter 1 through 1985, quarter 2, equal to 0 otherwise,
DTP = intercept dummy variable for the Dairy Termination Program equal to 1 
for 1986, quarter 2 through 1987, quarter 3, equal to 0 otherwise,
SIN1, COS1, and COS2 = harmonic seasonality variables representing the first 
wave of the sine function (1,0,-1,0), the first wave of the cosine 
function (0,-1,0,1), and the second wave of the cosine function (-1,1,­
1,1), respectively. (1,0,-1,0) etc. are values for each quarter, where 
the first quarter means 7r/2, second i r , third 3 tt/ 2 , and fourth 2ir ,
U., = lagged residual,
Q, = fluid milk marketed (billion pounds),
N = U.S. population (million persons),
Pf = effective Class I price estimated using equation (12) ($/cwt),
CPI = consumer price index for all items (1982-84 = 100),
INC = disposable personal income per capita ($1,000),
GA, and BA, = generic and branded fluid advertising expenditures deflated by 
the media price index ($1,000), respectively 
AU19 = ratio of persons under 19 years old to the total population (total=l), 
Qm = manufacturing milk marketed (billion pounds),
Pm = M-W price ($/cwt),
BAm = branded manufacturing advertising expenditures (including branded butter 
advertising, branded ice cream advertising, and branded cheese 
advertising) deflated by the media price index ($1,000),
D89.4 = intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for 1989, quarter 4, equal to 0 
otherwise,
D90.4 = intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for 1990, quarter 4, equal to 0 
otherwise.
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The fluid milk demand function is the processors' demand 
for raw milk. To insure that all identities are meaningful, all 
quantities in the model are measured on a milk-fat equivalent 
basis. Per capita fluid milk demand (Qf/N) is explained by the 
effective fluid milk price (Pf), per capita income (INC), the 
ratio of persons under 19 years old to the total population 
(AU19), current and lagged fluid advertising expenditures 
(branded BAf, and generic GAf), and harmonic seasonality 
variables (SIN1, C0S1, and C0S2). The variables Pf and INC are 
deflated by the consumer price index, and BAf and GAf are by the 
media price index. A polynomial distributed lag is imposed to 
account for lagged generic fluid advertising effects. The second 
degree polynomial distributed lag with both endpoints constrained 
to lie close to zero, with the five quarter lag length, provides 
the most significant results. The effects are the largest four 
to six months later, and erode in about a year. No lagged 
effects of branded fluid advertising are found to be significant, 
but the current effect is significant. Calculated at mean data 
points, the elasticities of fluid demand with respect to price, 
income, and branded fluid advertising are -0.293, 0.483, and 
0.0089, respectively. Liu et al.'s estimated elasticities of 
retail fluid demand with respect to price and income were -0.282 
and 0.154, respectively. The long run generic advertising 
elasticity is 0.054, which is similar to Kinnucan and Forker's 
estimate of 0.051 in New York City, but larger than Liu et al.'s 
estimate of 0.0175 for retail-level national fluid demand. The 
fluid demand function is estimated using a linear form because
Fluid Milk Demand Function
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other functional forms (double-log, semi-log, log-inverse, and 
inverse) resulted in negative marginal revenue estimates and are 
thus rejected because negative fluid milk marginal revenue 
precludes discussion of the collusion case expressed by equation 
(2).4 TSLS is used to estimate this equation because both 
quantity and price are endogenous in the model.
Manufacturing Milk Demand Function
Because this is processors' demand for raw milk, government 
purchases of dairy products and changes in commercial inventories 
are not treated separately. Per capita manufacturing milk demand 
(Qm/N) is estimated as a function of the manufacturing milk price 
(Pm) deflated by the CPI, per capita income (INC) deflated by the 
CPI, the ratio of persons under 19 years old to the total 
population (AU19), current and lagged manufacturing milk 
advertising expenditures (branded BAj,,, and generic GA^ , an 
intercept dummy variable for the DTP, and harmonic seasonality 
variables (SIN1, C0S1, and C0S2). The federal dairy price 
support program is considered in this equation in that the 
manufacturing milk price (Pm = M-W price) is indirectly supported 
through government purchases of dairy products. Intercept dummy 
variables are also included for the fourth quarters of 1989 and 
1990 because regression residuals for both periods are very 
large. The outlier for the fourth quarter of 1989 is likely due 
to the unusually strong demand for nonfat dry milk during that 
quarter, but we have no explanation for the fourth quarter 1990
4The manufacturing demand function is also estimated using a 
linear form to be consistent with the fluid demand function.
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outlier. A polynomial distributed lag is imposed to account for 
lagged branded manufacturing advertising effects. The second 
degree polynomial distributed lag with both endpoints constrained 
to lie close to zero, with three quarter lag length, provides the 
most significant results. On the other hand, we could not 
estimate any significant effects of generic manufacturing 
advertising (a negative coefficient with very small t-value is 
found). The variable, AU19, is also not significant. 
Consequently, these variables are dropped from the model. The 
estimated coefficient on the income variable is negative and 
significant, which is not consistent with what one would expect. 
Because each dairy product has a very different demand trend and 
structure, disaggregated estimation would likely produce better 
results, however, this is beyond the scope of our present 
analysis. Calculated at mean data points, the elasticities of 
manufacturing demand with respect to price and long run branded 
advertising are -1.575 and 0.234, respectively. The estimated 
price elasticity is relatively large compared to previous studies 
such as -0.928 by Liu et al. Again, TSLS was used to estimate 
this equation because both manufacturing demand and price are 
endogenous in the model.
"Market Power" Parameter
The "market power" parameter equals one, under monopoly or 
collusion and zero under perfect competition or price-taking 
behavior. Two different values of annual average 0's derived 
from equation (3) or (4) with estimates of fluid and 
manufacturing demand equations are reported in table 3. 6m = 0
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is assumed in case 1, and Of = Om in case 2. 0 values are larger
when Of = Om is assumed, but the differences are relatively 
small. The results for both cases indicate that the U.S. milk 
market is neither perfectly competitive nor purely monopolistic. 
On a scale from 0 to 1, the data imply some "market power" that 
has been declining over time.
Table 3. Estimated "Market Power" Parameters (Annual 
Average)
Year
Case 1
0f when 0m = 0
Case 2
= om
1977 0.077(0.024)a 0.089b
1978 0.065(0.021) 0.075
1979 0.066(0.021) 0.076
1980 0.066(0.021) 0.076
1981 0.065(0.020) 0.076
1982 0.061(0.019) 0.072
1983 0.059(0.019) 0.071
1984 0.056(0.018) 0.066
1985 0.061(0.019) 0.073
1986 0.057(0.018) 0.067
1987 0.058(0.018) 0.069
1988 0.050(0.016) 0.059
1989 0.044(0.014) 0.052
1990 0.055(0.017) 0.065
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors defined 
by: (Pf-Pm)*N/(Qf*CPI)•[standard error of the fluid
demand function's estimated slope].
bStandard errors cannot be computed in this case because 
of the nonlinear relationship.
Simulations
To determine the validity of the estimated model, values 
for the endogenous variables, given the values for the exogenous 
variables, are determined in a dynamic simulation by the Gauss- 
Seidel technique for the historical period 1980-90. As
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illustrated by the mean absolute percent errors shown in Table 4, 
the largest error is less than 4%, which is small for dynamic 
simulation.
Table 4. Mean Absolute Percent Errors3 (1980.1-90.4)
Endogenous Variables
Mean Absolute 
Case 1
Percent Error 
Case 2
% %
Fluid Milk Price (Pf) 3.10 3.16
Manufacturing Milk Price (pm) 3.70 3.69
Blend Price (BP) 3.54 3.56
Fluid Milk Demand (Qf) 1.60 1.59
Manufacturing Milk Demand (Qm) 2.91 2.88
Milk Production (Q) 1.67 1.66
aThe formula is: (l/n)£|(P-A)/A|xlOO, where P is the predicted
value and A is the actual value.
To estimate the effectiveness of generic milk advertising, 
we simulate scenarios with 1% increases in generic fluid 
advertising expenditures in every period from the first quarter 
of 1980 until the fourth quarter of 1990. Because we could not 
estimate any significant effectiveness of generic manufacturing 
advertising, only generic fluid advertising expenditures are 
considered. The effectiveness is shown by increases in producer 
surplus associated with 1% increases in the advertising 
expenditures. The change in producer surplus is approximated by 
the following trapezoid area:
18
(BP'-BP)•(Q1+Q-2•FUSE)/2,
where ' represents ex post value. Ex ante values are not 
observations but values solved by fully dynamic simulation.
The results of both imperfect competition models (case 1 
and 2), as well as the exogenous fluid (Class I) price 
differential model are shown in Table 5. The results represent 
the average increase in producer surplus, prices, and quantities 
from 1980 through 1990 associated with a 1% increase in generic 
advertising expenditures.
It is clear from the simulation results that producers 
benefit from increased generic advertising expenditures. The 1% 
increase in generic milk advertising expenditures causes fluid 
milk quantity and price to increase by 0.0484% and 0.0222%, 
respectively, under case 1, and 0.0478% and 0.0243%, 
respectively, under case 2. There is a larger increase in fluid 
milk price, and a smaller increase in fluid quantity under case 2 
than under case 1. Consequently, the 1% increase in generic 
fluid milk advertising results in a smaller decrease in 
manufacturing milk quantity and a smaller increase in 
manufacturing milk price under case 2 than under case 1. The 
derived "market power" parameters are larger in case 2 than in 
case 1. The results show that with greater market power, generic 
fluid milk advertising causes a larger increase in fluid milk 
price and a smaller increase in fluid quantity. Hence, greater 
market power results in larger returns to producers with fluid 
demand more price-inelastic than manufacturing demand. Producer 
surplus increases by $1,017 million for case 1, and $1,044 
million for case 2.
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Table 5. Estimated Average Increases in Producer Surplus 
Associated with 1% Increases in Advertising 
Expenditures (1980-90)
Imperfect 
Comoetition Model 
Case 1 Case 2
K  - 0 »f - K
Exogenous Fluid 
Price Differential 
Model
Increases in 
Producer 
Surplus (1000$) 1,017 1,044 902
Percent changes in:
Fluid Milk 
Price (%) 0.0222 0.0243 0.0135
Fluid Milk 
Quantity (%) 0.0484 0.0478 0.0508
Manufacturing 
Milk Price (%) 0.0154 0.0150 0.0171
Manufacturing 
Milk Quantity 
(%) -0.0214 -0.0208 -0.0237
The simulation also reveals that the conventional Class I 
price differential model under-states the benefits of generic 
fluid milk advertising. For example, the increase in fluid milk 
price is 0.0087 points larger, and the increase in fluid quantity 
is 0.0024 points smaller under case 1 than under the conventional 
model. Consequently, there is a smaller decrease in manufactur­
ing milk quantity and a smaller increase in manufacturing price 
under case 1 than under the conventional model. In terms of
producer welfare, the increase in producer surplus due to a 1%
%
increase in generic milk advertising is 13% (case 1) and 16%
(case 2) larger with the imperfect competition model than with
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the exogenous fluid differential model. Because greater market 
power results in larger returns to producers, the exogenous fluid 
differential model that ignores the degree of imperfect 
competition underestimates the effectiveness of the U.S. generic 
milk advertising.
Conclusions
In this paper we developed a framework to evaluate U.S. 
generic milk advertising effectiveness accounting for the degree 
of competition. The effective fluid milk price differential is 
endogenously explained by the degree of market power in the 
model. The traditional model with an exogenous fluid price 
differential does not account for the degree of imperfect 
competition. The estimated "market power" parameters indicate 
that there is some market power in the U.S. milk market. The 
model with an endogenously determined fluid differential provides 
simulation results that indicate that greater market power 
results in larger returns from generic milk advertising, and, 
therefore, the traditional model with an exogenous fluid price 
differential may underestimate the magnitude of impacts of the 
U.S. generic milk advertising.
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Appendix
An Alternative Solution
For simplicity, fluid and manufacturing demand equations 
are specified as follows:
(Al) Qf = a + bPf 
(A2) Qm = c + dPm
Then, equality across markets of "perceived" marginal revenue is: 
(A3) Pf + 0f-Qf/b = Pm + 0m*Qm/d
In this paper, we tried to estimate 0's from (A3) using estimates 
of (Al) and (A2).
Alternatively, substituting (A2) into (A3) yield:
(A4) Pf = —Of/b'Qf + (1 + 0m)Pm + 0m-c/d 
If (Al) and (A4) are estimated without estimating (A2), both 9f 
and 0m are identified, but c and d cannot be identified 
separately.
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